

# History and Historiography

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## Russia and the Caucasus: Historical Factors of Unsuccessful Incorporation

Embarking on the colonization of the Caucasus, the higher echelons of the Russian political elite did not originally think long and hard about the depth and limits of this phenomenon. The grandeur of the task deprived them of the chance to perceive the details and the impatience and excitement of the central authorities did not allow the executors to prove the need for the scrupulous elaboration on the colonization project and its details.

It is difficult to say whether St Petersburg had originally implied the need for the development of the multilayer project of colonization or whether this multilayer structure the Russian authorities faced in reality took them all by surprise and conditioned both the existence of the multitude of the simultaneously emergent tasks and, possibly, the unforeseen slowing down of the colonization processes as a whole.

Besides, it is difficult to come to an unequivocal conclusion on the basis of the examination of the currently available documents (“Акты собранные Кавказской археографической комиссией. Тифлис, 1866-1904”; “Материалы по истории Дагестана и Чечни. (Первая половина XIX в.)”; “Шамиль – ставленник султанской Турции и английских колонизаторов. Сборник документальных материалов”; “Кабардино-русские отношения в XVI-XVIII вв.: Документы и материалы”; “Движение горцев Северо-Восточного Кавказа в 20-50-х гг. XIX в. Сборник документов”; “Черкесы и другие народы Северо-Западного Кавказа в период правления Екатерины II. 1762-1774 гг.”; “Кавказ и Российская империя: проекты, идеи, иллюзии и реальность. Начало XIX-XX вв.”), to what extent the appointed military men and administrators succeeded in convincing St Petersburg that the consolidation of the positions of the Russian state in the Caucasus would require the heterogeneous ways of realization of colonial tasks for the ethnic and confessional groups so different in their existential nature that inhabited the Caucasian region. It is not always clear to what extent St Petersburg was prepared to face the situation when the Russian efforts could possibly be confronted with the self-denying irreconcilability of the ethnic and socio-cultural territory hostile to Russia.

It is even more difficult to understand whether the initiators of Russia’s movement to the East were aware of the fact that the territory occupied by force of arms as such is secondary as regards the indigenous ethnic and social structures forming the basis in the system of any colonization.

Many of the best minds of the Russian nobility were fascinated by the images of the Caucasus that had entered the Russian life from the pages of the books by A.S. Pushkin, M.Y. Lermontov, A.S. Griboedov, A.A. Bestuzhev-

Marlinsky, V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, L.N. Tolstoi. Many other less known writers and authors of memoirs assisted the greats in the job of exciting and impressing Russia with the vague but poetic pictures of oriental fairy-tales and crammed the pages of Russian magazines with their evidence that amazed the public by the romanticism and exotic characters of the remote country.

The Caucasus at that time was sort of Mecca (more virtual, than real) for the ecstatic young noble people, who were craving for wild passions, exploits and exceptional experiences and who approved of Russia’s ongoing movement to the East. At the same time few people understood the very need for and the entire responsibility and consequences of this step.

Among those few people who were not impressed by the romanticism of the Orient and who developed a pragmatic approach to the business, and who were seeking everywhere the political and state advantages and meanings, were “the people of “the year (18)14,” among whom the first violin was played by P.I. Pestel. Being the representative of the Russian elite, who held his own views on the ways of the development of the Russian society and being the officer of the Russian army, he not only knew but expressed the opinion shared by those people on the “Caucasian issue” (Высочков 294).

P.I. Pestel’s position, in a paradoxical way for a member of the political opposition, coincided with the Emperor’s opinion in that the mountain regions of the Caucasus for certain strategic considerations must be incorporated with Russia. He subdivided the ethnic peoples inhabiting the Caucasus into the “peaceful” and “wild” tribes and offered a radical solution to the problems of colonization and pacification of the area. All the “wild” and recalcitrant tribes should be moved under compulsion into the interior of Russia in small quantities and settled in all the Russian volosts (regions) (Пестель 144).

Simultaneously, the Russian political elite had not only failed at the verbal level to explain clearly or intelligibly to the society why it needed the Caucasus, but it had also failed to say what kind of Caucasus it was talking about – the Caucasus as the territory for the geopolitical game or the Caucasus as the society inhabited by the martial ethnic groups alien to the Russian spirit and mode of life.

The generals would “conquer”, “suppress”, “reconcile” or “re-incorporate” the Caucasus with the empire. This made the task clear, but not the goal. The fact that Russia’s higher political authorities were lacking the tradition of explaining the goals of this or that activity made matters worse.

One could only make a guess at the goals of the ruling imperial house by analyzing the tasks the emper-

ors had set to the governor-generals of the Caucasus or the commanders-in-chief of the Independent Caucasian Corps though even this fact did not make it easier to keep up with the changers in the monarch's mood. For example, Emperor Nicholas I in a letter to his favourite I.F. Paskevich written soon after the conclusion of the Adrianopolis peace agreement said: "Having thus finished one glorious deed, you are going to have another one, in my eyes no less glorious, and, with regard to the obvious benefit, far more important – the suppression for good of the mountain peoples or the extermination of the recalcitrant. This matter does not require an immediate approach, but it requires decisive and mature execution..." ("Движение горцев Северо-Восточного Кавказа в 20-50-х гг. XIX в." 58).

Twelve years after, in a memo to General A.I. Neudhart the Emperor wrote in his own hand: "I do not want any conquests and consider the very thought of them as criminal. I want the consolidation of our domination of the territory which I currently recognize as extremely unsteady and unfaithful... As follows from the above, the conquest of the population of the Caucasus inimical to us is absolutely essential, but this conquest should be executed not only by force of arms, on the contrary, we should act cautiously, not in haste, and in such a way, that wherever we reach we should never come back until we have firmly consolidated our grip on the territory" (Гордин 380).

Towards the middle of the XIX century it became obvious for Nicholas I that in the clash of the two military tactics, two different armies: Russian, acting according to the military rules, and mountaineous, unpredictable, using guerrilla warfare – Russia had no chances, at least, of a quick military victory, and one had to try to find some new techniques of the military operations (Чернуха 237).

The search, as before, was conducted in the field of the organization of the control over the forces and territory and also in the field of the personnel policy. One had to search for the core of the philosophy of the problem in order to be able to realize the new tactical techniques afterwards. Having no understanding of the general philosophy of the problem of colonialism but constantly changing the people, the authorities were constantly moving in the inevitable vicious circle and were returning to the former unsatisfactory results.

After the Darghin failure of 1845 there began a new period of the Caucasian policy of the Russian Empire: "the recognition of the Caucasus as a special territory requiring a peculiar form of its control and an exceptional art of the organization of the interior life of the territory where the military operations are still going on" (Ibid. 238).

Emperor Nicholas I made his choice in favour of the elderly Count M.S. Vorontsov, evidently not quite suitable for the role of the Caucasian military leader but with many years' experience and wisdom of an administrator he was just the kind of man the Caucasus, according to the Emperor's opinion, needed.

It was he who was entrusted with the task of the realization of the new will of the monarch to improve the territory, to establish good relations with the Caucasian tribes, to demonstrate the advantages of a peaceful life under the protectorate of the mighty empire. Besides

Georgia started to gain a special status not only because the majority of its population professed the Orthodox Christian religion but because Georgia was becoming the main field of the application of M.S. Vorontsov's energy, who was ordered to turn Georgia into the showcase of the new life. By Georgia's visible successes they hoped to enthrone the rest of the Caucasus.

But the other Caucasus, consisting of the heterogeneous mountain tribes, did not appreciate M.S. Vorontsov's efforts, as it had not appreciated the efforts of its former governors. The other Caucasus, that was hardly aware of the difference between the time of peace and the time of war could not be fascinated by the life based on the agrarian, industrial or trade enterprise which was offered to them as a substitute for the freedom of life and raid audacity outside the rigorous state and legal framework. Besides, the other Caucasus for the greater part lacked the natural conditions of Georgia favourable for the regular economic activity and therefore kept clinging to their own old forms of life and did not see the need to change them.

Russia had failed to formulate the price it could and was ready to pay for the Caucasus. St Petersburg had also failed to think out all the ways and means – in the short term and in the long term – it would require for the all-round successful colonization of the newly-obtained territory.

In this connection there existed and competed with each other a multitude of projects and proposals, both sensible and phantasmagorical, which were actively appealing to St Petersburg authorities to take sides (Гордин 380).

Between St Petersburg (the Caucasian Committee) and the commanders-in-chief of the Separate Caucasian Corp, who were simultaneously the representatives of the higher Russian authorities in Georgia, there often arose contradictions concerning the choice of the ways and means of "conquering the Caucasus", which can also serve as proof of the presence of improvisation and spontaneity in the development of the strategy and tactics of the "Russian cause" (Лисицына 203-236; 237-251).

To begin with, the colonizer himself was not prepared for the mission. He was either a spontaneous initiator – a Cossack or a peasant, or all kinds of "idle" people, or a retired military, or an obscure collector of the exotica, rather than a prudent engineer or a trader-conquistador.

And it was not until they had realized that "the Caucasian territory in terms of its locality, population and historical destiny is divided into several parts, quite different from one another. The peculiarities of these separate parts of the territory have a great impact both on the manner of the military operations and on the very prospects and measures of the government" (Эсадзе 5), that the authorities took the path of better organization of the means of colonization.

The colonization of the North Caucasus started with the transformation of the Cossack territories by the inclusion of the Cossack stanitsas (settlements) and troops in the general military and civil system of the empire's administration. The Cossacks constituted the vanguard of the colonization forces but the way itself of their preparation to the duty entrusted with them was extreme-

ly tough. The Cossacks were constantly made to change the place of their residence. The generals would drive the whole Cossack stanitsas into the new places which was causing unrest among them, as, for example, in the Black Sea Area (“Северный Кавказ в составе Российской империи” 170).

In Daghestan the Russian colonization was carried out only on the plain and with great difficulty, leaving the mountains without its reliable influence. The main obstacle here were the natural conditions that complicated the work of the “Russian element” both by their unaccustomed gloom and the extreme hardships of the climate. The initial colonization of the Ciscaucasia, which started in the last third of the XVIII and was going on during the first half of the XIX c. – was chiefly military – Cossack by nature (Куприянова 131). According to general D.I. Romanovsky, the supreme power employed the Cossacks solely for the political goals, regarding them as “a means of the acceleration of the conquest of the mountaineers” (Романовский 25).

In the clash with the Caucasus the Russian element not only failed to subdue the Caucasian spirit, but it was itself infected with its special vibration and would often turn into the subject if not alien to Russia than strongly “poisoned” by the Caucasus. The boundary between the Cossacks and the mountaineers was vacillating. The Cossacks were under a considerable influence of their mountaineous neighbours both in the organization of the communal administration and local authority and in the military life including the methods of warfare, raids and attire (“Северный Кавказ в составе Российской империи” 60; Баддели 27-28).

Under the influence of the factors originally overlooked, the transformative activity of the colonizers led to an unexpected result: the Caucasus was to be conquered and turned into a part of the Russian world but, for a greater part, it was the Russian world that would undergo this transformation thus distancing itself in its spirit from the world of the metropoly. This was gradually manifested both in the equipment and methods of the warfare by the units of the Separate Caucasian Corps and in the change of the attitude to the involvement in the military operations and in the general reappraisal by the Russian Caucasians of their earthly life strongly diluted by the Oriental motives (Ляпин 289-290).

The Caucasian citadel proved to be much stronger than it was seen from St Petersburg: Russia failed to break by storm either its spirit, or its traditional social structure. There, where the Caucasus was devoid of the Russian element or this element was not numerous, the Russian influence was minimal or its presence was hardly noticeable. The conditions of the Caucasus proved to be unshakeable and, therefore, the Caucasian peoples preserved their nature and faith, thus hindering the progress of the colonizers and colonialism, which demanded a change in the tactics: from the storm to the siege.

Speaking about the colonization of the Caucasus by Russia one should bear in mind that it is not about the establishment and development of the contacts between the Slavs and the inhabitants of the mountaineous territory as such. Naturally, being geographically at a relatively close distance, they could not avoid the contacts with one another and had had such contacts from the early Middle Ages.

Under the colonization of the Caucasus by Russia one means a different content and different existential meanings Russia was bringing through a regular process of the conquest and transformation of a certain territory organized and directed by the political will of the state and implemented by the state itself.

If one makes an attempt to establish the temporal framework of this process one has to note that, actually, the colonization of the Caucasus on the part of the Russian Empire in the true sense of the word began to be realized from the age of Peter the Great. Then the expansionist impulse temporarily abated during the reign of his successors. However the fallen banner of colonialism was picked up by Empress Catherine II.

The course of the further discussions of this problem requires the clarification of the terminological side of the problem. Up to now in the literature on the study of the Caucasus there does not exist a clear and uncontroversial understanding of the essence of the terms used – colonization and colonialism. The situation is aggravated by the introduction into this problem of moral judgments, which completely confuses the issue and lends the problem the initially negative nuance that blocks the opportunity for objective research.

In the tsarist Russia they proceeded from the all-European understanding of these terms. S.N. Yuzhakov subdivided colonization into the domestic emigration and colonization in Russia (“Колонизация внутренняя” 195-196). The first two varieties of colonization, in his view, were the measures taken by the government for the creation of more favourable economic conditions in the country. As an example S.N. Yuzhakov takes Germany where with that end in view they settled the depopulated regions of the eastern, western, southern and middle Prussia. Many people were evicted to the western industrial areas, and many country folk emigrated with the same end in view to America and Africa.

The government of Germany materially supported their colonizers – peasants and workers of the German nationality – by having allocated 100 million marks for the colonization of the provinces in western Prussia and Poznan.

Under colonization in Russia N.S. Yuzhakov understood the penetration of the Cossacks into the Caucasus and the Terek region (Ibid. 198). The emigrants from foreign countries who at different times had settled within the bounds of Russia were called colonists in the official acts of the Russian Empire. Among those settlers the Germans constituted the majority. The colonists settled near St Petersburg, in the Polish Kingdom, in the Caucasus, but chiefly in the guberniyas (provinces) – Saratov, Samara, Ekaterinoslavl', Kherson and Tavria. From the beginning of the XIX c. the main flow of the colonists made for Tavria where they founded about 200 colonies populated by about 100 thousand settlers. In the Caucasus there were about 30 thousand German colonists of either sex. The oldest of the German colonies was Karras (Ibid. 198).

S.N. Yuzhakov called “the settlements connected or not connected with the metropoly” colonies (from L. Colonus – tiller of the soil). The inhabitants of the colonies either thanks to the protection from the metropoly or by virtue of the conditions of the social life preserved the peculiarities, manners and customs of their national-

ity. This distinguishes colonization from emigration.

The international law that existed in the XIX century, in S.N. Yuzhakov's rendering, defined as colonies only such settlements that were in the state or internationally- legal dependence on the metropoly and he subdivides them according to the degree of dependence into 3 classes:

- 1) Colonies proper – the overseas territories of the country, administratively subordinated to it;
- 2) Protected countries with a special administrative system under the protection of the metropoly;
- 3) spheres of interests of the influential European countries in Africa.

From the economic point of view colonies were subdivided in their turn into 4 classes:

- 1) Conquered colonies whose settlers benefit not so much from their own production as from the political and military exploitation of the natives.
- 2) Trading colonies that were founded in the country where one could buy and sell many things, where for some reasons there was no developed trade. Practically all such colonies developed from trading stations. To found such colonies, first of all, one had to rely upon the sea power of the country-the colonizer.

3) Land-tilling colonies that could be found only in the countries where the climatic and agricultural conditions promised the settlers a peaceful life, moreover in the conditions not essentially different from their mode of life in the metropoly.

4) Plantations – agricultural colonies in the Torrid Zone (Ibid. 199).

P.N. Milyukov ("Колонизация" 736) in the entry for the Encyclopedic Dictionary of F.A. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron for 1895 wrote that under colonization one habitually understands mass settlement in an uncivilized country of the emigrants from some civilized country. The result of such settlement is a colony or a colonial country under this or other form of dependence on the metropoly, i.e. the country the emigrants have come from.

P.N. Milyukov, as well as S.N. Yuzhakov, distinguishes between several types of colonies: 1) conquered colonies. Here colonization is executed by the representatives of the military groups of the well-known people in order to exploit the labour of the enslaved population to their advantage; 2) agricultural and cattle-breeding colonies. As a rule such colonization is carried out by huge masses and comes from the densely-populated countries with a considerable increment of the population; 3) trading colonies.

According to P.N. Milyukov, colonization for the last four centuries has been accomplished, as a rule, solely by the civilized nations, who while occupying the new countries seldom find them completely unpopulated. In the majority of the cases in the process of colonization there always occur clashes between the emigrants from the civilized countries and the "uncivilized" natives. In this kind of confrontation the Europeans in order to achieve their narrow egoistic goals do not hesitate to resort to the most disgraceful cruelty, bare-faced lie and gross violence. The interests of the natives are taken into consideration, but it is the white colonists who benefit from these interests (Ibid. 737).

As for the Russian colonization proper, in the Ciscaucasia region already in the XVIII c. they were making

attempts at a regular government- controlled colonization. The old Cossack population of the Ciscaucasia, the Terek and Grebensk Cossacks, were supplemented by order of Catherine II by the new regiments of the Cossacks evicted from the Don and Volga areas (Ibid. 746).

From this notion of the Russian colonization it is impossible to understand whether everything that has been said before about the colonization coming from the civilized countries to the uncivilized native regions fully refers to the Russian colonization or it does not.

V.O. Klyuchevsky with reference to colonization said (Ключевский 31) that the history of Russia is the history of the country which is being colonized. The area of its colonization was expanding together with the expansion of the county's territory. From the beginning of the XVII c. and up to the middle of the XIX c. the Russian people quickly populated the whole plain from the Baltic and White Seas to the Black Sea, to the Caucasian mountain range, to the Caspian Sea and the Urals and they even penetrated the southern and the eastern areas farther beyond the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and the Urals.

In this case, as in the case of P.N. Milyukov's view, they only state the process but they do not assess or define the essence of the phenomenon.

The Encyclopaedic Dictionary of the Russian Bibliographic Institute Granat (517-518) notes, that the history of the entire mankind is partially the history of the colonization of the globe, i.e. it emphasizes the general character of colonization as a process which is seen as the settling of peoples across the territory of the Earth.

The cause of the settling is the desire of the population to use for the expansion as much of the Earth's territory as possible. This aspiration at the first stages of the social development arises as the result of the reproduction of the population. After the transition to the settled way of life the root cause of colonization is the social struggle.

Colonies establish themselves and the colonial policy only begins when the people close to the state power have an interest in the colonial trade. The process of colonization and its history are closely connected with the economic development and change in the social relations in the metropolies. The development of colonization was not so much dependent on the size of the population residing in the metropoly and evicted from it as on its trade and military power (Ibid. 521).

The monopolistic nature of the trade and a lack among the population of the criteria of the value of the goods brought from other countries provided the opportunity for the colonial tradesmen to make a huge profit. The British East-India Company in its trade with India made from 134% to 340% profit, and the Portuguese expeditions to India made up to 500% profit (Ibid. 519).

Then the authors of the Dictionary of the Institute Granat point out to the process of the change in the essence of the colonial policy and the beginning of the organization of the colonies themselves. As long as the natives constitute the dominant population of the colony and the number of the settlers is insignificant, as long as it is exploited by trading capital, the colonial policy of the metropoly regarding the colony and the native population is the policy of exploitation and violence and it is reduced to the aspiration to retain the colony by force and

make it serve the interests of the entrepreneurs exploiting the colony. As regards the mass of the settlers from the metropoly, such policy becomes impossible, and the link with the metropoly is established on more civilized and free principles (Ibid. 524).

The Big Soviet Encyclopedia (30) defines colonization as 1) settling of the waste land; 2) turning some dependent country into a colony by means of its military or economic enslavement. Colonization is accompanied by brutal exploitation and destruction of the local population; 3) organization of settlement in a country.

Then follows the clarification of the notion "colony". From the point of view of the authors of the BSE, colonies are the spheres of export of capital and goods, sources of raw materials for metropolies, the most important source of enrichment of not only individual monopolies but even of the whole countries that turn into the renter countries, into the countries of the "parasitic decaying capitalism" (Ibid. 34).

The authors of the BSE also give attention to the means of colonization, picking out in this range the colonial companies which were granted by their governments the monopoly on the trade with the colonies. The colonial companies enjoyed the unlimited rights in the colonies: they appointed their officials, had their own court of law, exploited mines, minted coins, built ports, kept mercantile and Navy fleets and land forces. The colonial companies would wage war not only upon the local peoples and tribes but also upon other countries. However the Russian colonization did not know the colonial campaigns as the main means of colonization and colonialism which was typical of England, Holland, France (Ibid. 29).

One of the major researchers of the Caucasus of the Soviet period A.V. Fadeev considered, that "every colonialist movement is caused not by some ideological motives or peculiarities of national character, but by the economic requirements of the social classes and social conditions of their life. Moreover, the state encourages only those forms and directions of the process of colonization, which are advantageous, at the given moment, for the ruling class" (qtd. "Северный Кавказ в составе Российской империи" 134).

The Big Explanatory Sociological Dictionary (Collins) defines colonialism as political control, direct or indirect, of one country, one nation over another. Colonialism is connected with the domination of one ethnic group over others on the territory of the oppressed group. Colonialism signified the desire to impose alien cultural values or the attempts to root out the religions, languages, customs, and the economic activity of the colonized groups (310).

The Russian Humanitarian Encyclopedic Dictionary (3-11) in its turn defines the term "colonization" as a process of settling and economic development of the disused land inside one's own country. Colonization sometimes proved to be a favourable factor in the development of the economy, political organization and culture in the colonized countries. Thus the process of the colonization of the South of Russia by means of the resettlement from the center to the South of peasants resulted in a considerable increase in the size of the Russian population in the Ukraine, Transcaucasia and in the North Caucasus.

All the above-mentioned interpretations of the terms "colonization" and "colonialism" insufficiently re-

veal their correlation and interdependence, though they offer their essential definitions. The drawback obscuring the meaning of the terminology is, in the first place, the multitude of the approaches and essential principles, lacking universality.

Some of them emphasize the civilizing mission of the so-called "civilized" countries as regards "uncivilized" countries, others focus on the social-class aspect of the phenomenon under consideration, or they confine themselves to a mere verification of the fact of the existence of colonization as a natural worldwide phenomenon of the stage-by-stage development of human civilization.

And if the situation with the definition of the essence of colonization and classification of colonies is more or less satisfactory, a lack of the in-depth analysis of the correlations between the terms hinders understanding of this phenomenon and prepares the ground for all kinds of socio-political speculations.

Therefore one should see the indicated problem as the correlation between strategy and tactics, when strategy (colonialism) determines the principles, program, bounds and essence, and tactics (colonization) condition the mechanisms and processes.

As follows from the above, the distinctions between colonialism and colonization are such that the former is a general and broad term as regards the latter, which reflects the socio-political phenomenon, state of the society and the direction of the frame of mind of its political and economic elite. The second term is narrower and it contains practice, means and ways of the realization of the process.

Colonialism as a political strategy represents a system of the large-scale decisions and planned directions of activity, whose successive realization is intended to achieve in a more or less satisfactory way the main goals set for the historically definite period of time by the state institutes and other organized subjects of politics.

Colonialism as any political strategy should be distinguished by a well-thought out concept of the correlation in space and time of the forces and means the state can dispose of, allowing it a freedom of their manoeuvre. One has also to determine the key stages of achieving the main goals, while understanding the specific nature of each stage, its advantages and disadvantages. Besides such strategy should have some alternative ways of its realization in case of the possible upsetting of the adopted plans, the alternative ways of the struggle and ways of putting them into force as the necessity arises.

The completeness and the succession of the realized strategy, and its final success to a great degree depend on the competence of the developers of a political strategy, on their political vision and ability to provide a comprehensive assessment of all the circumstances and risks that the work of achieving the main objectives will be or objectives can be faced with.

Colonization as political tactics represents the aggregate of the methods and forms of political activity aimed at the realization of this or that stage of the strategy introduced and used in practice in accordance with the concrete situations arising in the course of the implementation of the adopted strategic plans. Tactics should facilitate, but not contradict strategy.

The way the Russian authorities structured the

space of the Caucasus, the way they intertwined it with the Empire, the way they introduced and cancelled these or those forms of control over its individual administrative units and the region as a whole (governor-generals, governors, chief administrators), the way they expanded or reduced the degree of the autonomy in their work proves the insufficient preparation of the imperial institutes and authorities for the mission they undertook.

Such shilly-shallying led to a failure of this or that approach, making the authorities develop and test the effectiveness of the next project in the process of colonization thus condemning all the previous projects to a clash with the new ones and breeding uncertainty in the executives of the state will and chaos in the affairs.

It is worth noting that the Russian world was not a consistent and methodical reformer, its hand would work either superficially or, fascinated by the Caucasus, it would voluntarily abandon the persistent transformational efforts while adopting and embracing the Caucasian mode of life as their own in the conditions entirely new for the Russian people.

The Russian people world did not aim to shake the foundations of the Caucasian world, nor did it intend to demonstrate the force of its creative superiority, but its lenience and toleration made it possible to preserve all the old traditional structures, which not only remained intact but, on the contrary, became all the stronger for it and, as a result, were not demolished by the pressure of the crushing military supremacy.

Having failed to demolish the centuries-old patriarchy – this first principle of the Caucasus – by the new value motivations and social ideas, Russia failed to win the affections of the Caucasus that could nourish its nature by the new sources of life.

The colonists did not advance by a broad front, but having won back their right to the Caucasus first from the Ottoman Empire and then from the Persian Empire, Russia for a long time had lived within the framework of the military pressure on the Caucasus, it multiplied the lists of the heroes, but its progress on the road of the transformation of the Caucasian world was slow. Besides Russia made no attempts to introduce this world either to the new ideas or to the European educational system.

By preserving the mountain peoples' traditional organs of public power and only by intensifying its control over them, the Russian Caucasian administration failed to realize its regulatory force intended to penetrate the very depths of the Caucasian world by means of its tough and guiding hand.

The cautious policy of the Russian authorities in the North Caucasus region, as in the Caucasus as a whole, enabled the ethnic territories deprived of their sovereignty to maintain under the control of the central imperial authorities the required level of self-government indispensable to the stability by preserving the archaic and traditional values (Муратова 89).

The Russian elite lacked the breadth and integrity in their Caucasian policy, and the so-called "Russian cause" in the Caucasus failed to win or almost did not win any sincere and numerous supporters in the Caucasian environment proper and, particularly, among the Muslims.

The disparaging status of the Caucasus as a "warm Siberia" did not allow it for a long time to concentrate in

the region the best intellectual and active forces of the Russian nation and Russian culture. On the contrary, everything unfit and useless for the empire was flowing to the region. Incidentally, we cannot say, that all the elements or groups of the colonial flow were unintelligent or incompetent people.

In some cases the state itself rejected their abilities, turning their stay in the Caucasus into their punishment, into the stigma of social deficiency and inferiority. That was the lot of the Decembrists and numerous adherents to the Old Belief confessions.

Those who of their free will had come to the Caucasus, were filled with nostalgia for Russia, and tended to withdraw into their Russianness, doing little to promote the transformational efforts of the state. These people kept their memory of Russia and did not take the trouble to acquaint their voluntary or involuntary neighbours with the spirit and world of the Russian life and culture.

The colonization itself was divided into two branches – peasant (popular) branch and the nobility branch. The main Russian exponent of the new European and educational values – the nobility – was as alien to the Russian peasants as it was to the colonized mountaineers.

It was not the state that helped the Russian peasant colonization to take root in the new Caucasian reality, but the peasant mass itself left to its own devices developed the acceptable for itself existential practices deriving much from the mechanisms of the mode of life of the mountaineers.

Having come to the Caucasus, the Russian elite was not anxious about the overcoming in the quickest possible way of the limits of the natives' enmity so natural in the colonization processes, was not active enough in its search for the effective ways of the fast integration of the Caucasian population into the system of motivation and the orbit of the social and economic life of the empire. The Russian elite failed in a clearly, intelligible and simple way, in the system of the coordinates, natural to the Caucasus, to reveal their essence and advantages, to inspire their interest in them, thus opening the way for the natives of the Caucasus to the integration with Russia. Only a small part of the Caucasus, in the person of the Caucasian and for the most part Christian aristocracy, was freely admitted to the world of Russia.

The Persian campaign of Peter I, as a landmark in the Caucasian policy of the Russian state, marked the beginning of the progressive and frontal colonization, not well-thought-out and planned, but instinctive, as the intuitive feeling of the necessity connected with the imperial construction and imperial location and status. These efforts were hardly ever progressive and the progressiveness itself was largely determined not by the internal impulses, but by the external demands, imaginary or real.

Having routed the Osmanli Turks and Persians, Russia was faced with a growing interest in the Caucasus on behalf of Europe. And the stronger this interest was showing itself, the more firmly the impulse of the Russian elite to conquer and transform the Caucasian region was establishing itself, which, however, failed to grow into the unshakeable process, inherited and passed on from generation to generation.

Where they did succeed, they received only the crumbs. Either individual spheres or individual people,

at best – social groups, but either the marginalia or the aristocracy – always an insignificant minority. The stressful impact of the new culture produced a culture shock whose main cause was a striking difference between the Russian culture and that of the mountain peoples'. Each culture had a multitude of symbols and images and also behavior stereotypes used automatically by the people in different situations. But when the conquered mountain peoples found themselves in the conditions of the new culture of their former enemies, the habitual system of orientation proved to be inadequate to the circumstances they were enduring as the new culture was based on different ideas of the world, different norms and values, stereotypes of behaviour and perception (Садохин 123).

Even when the most irreconcilable and irresistibly hostile members of the mountain peoples (mukhadzhirs) withdrew from the territory, the success was either temporary or it failed to embrace all the bounds of the opportunity that arose. A major part of the indifferent or desperate people shocked by the defeat and great fear about their future refused to understand and did not embrace the changes, and the Russian authorities did not insist on the binding force of the new cultural principles for all those who had taken out citizenship of the Russian Empire.

At last all those who, nevertheless, believed in or hoped for the success and material benefits under Russia's protection, failed to receive them or they received them in such a way and form, that failed to become an attractive force, an object of social envy and aspirations. Besides those who hoped to rise to an important position under the new regime, became the social outcasts in their own environment, they were branded as traitors, were subjected to ostracism and violence, and the Russian authorities failed to protect their proselytes and, thereby, alienated from the "Russian cause" many of their potential allies.

Russia came to the Caucasus, but what was the idea? The idea, if it existed at all, remained unknown to the Caucasus, and therefore the Russian world proved hard to understand and appeared alien to the Caucasus. The Russian authorities failed to convey their message to the Caucasus (Emperors Nikolai Pavlovich in 1837 and Alexander Nikolaevich in 1861 sounded unconvincing to the Caucasian peoples).

Russia far too long had relied upon the power argument in their Caucasian policy considering that otherwise its arguments would sound less resolute and loud or these arguments were presented in such a way, that the mountain peoples were unable to find for themselves the places or forms of participation that did not demand the rejection of their traditional character and therefore the transformation of the mountain peoples' mode of life never really took place. During the whole of the XIX century the attempt to find the universality capable to reconcile the aspirations of the Caucasus and Russia proved to be a failure.

The principles of the Russian state structure because of their failure to take root in the native part of the Caucasus were compelled to accept the traditional structures of the pre-state system, which made the colonization efforts of Russia superficial and unconvincing, incapable of creating the lasting social, cultural, and mental basis in the region.

The traditional components of the political culture

of the main mass of the mountain ethnic groups whose preservation prevented the imperial authorities from full realization of their colonization tasks were represented by the following set of rules:

1) the priority of the "natural" ethnic, family, national group ties over any others (ideological, political, professional); 2) loyalty to those in the position of seniority in the existing hierarchical structures (the conservation of the traditional hierarchy and the traditional structures resulted in the local authority being closer and higher than the authority of the imperial administration and even of the white Emperor himself); 3) preference for the informal personal relationships as a means of the resolution of the problems of the appeal to the formal structures and legality (Мыратова 94).

In the South Caucasus the insufficient vigour of the Russian efforts was connected with their reliance on the orthodox Georgians and Christian co-religionists – the Armenians. In the North Caucasus the positive transformational activity was hindered by the lasting military confrontation (Георгиев В.А., Георгиев А.В. 19).

Having faced the shortage of the available Russian personnel (officials, all sorts of enterprising people), the Russian authorities soon delegated in the South Caucasus the colonization powers chiefly to the Armenians who willingly got down to business as under the aegis of Russia they could gain an entirely new prestigious status and broad opportunities for business.

In Georgia – unlike the Georgians – the Armenians did all kinds of work and therefore proved to be the indispensable helpers for the Russians, and in the Muslim areas of the eastern part of the South Caucasus the same Armenians were the one and only social basis oriented at the support and realization of the "Russian cause." The Armenians made a lot for the success of the Russians and helped them to consolidate their hold on the South Caucasus but these efforts were, though beneficial for Russia, not Russian in the content and form. However, there were no grounds to doubt the sincere attachment of the Armenians to Russia considering the fact, that the Muslim population of the Caucasus, seeing the preferential treatment of the Armenians by the Russian authorities, gave the Armenians no choice and regarded them as the indirect cause of their tragedy. Therefore the service to the "Russian cause" was for the Armenians an important argument in their battle for survival, which determined their approval of the imperial rules, but nevertheless the Armenians never ceased to be the people of the oriental culture.

In the process of conquering the Caucasus, the Russian generals and administrators in their overwhelming majority did not change the socio-cultural and economic set-up in the Caucasian region. If the English in the XVIII-XIX century were involving the colonized countries in the system of capitalist relations by radically undermining their established patriarchal structures, thereby reducing the ability of the social system to resistance, suppressing the force of the native mobilization mechanisms, inspiring fear by their power and giving the traditional solidarity no chance, Russia, on the contrary, did nothing of the kind.

The feudal system of the Caucasus, entangled in the numerous social structures and habits of the kin-and-tribal links, remained practically intact and therefore the

presence of Russia in the region manifested itself only in the military sphere and in the versions that were habitual to the Caucasus.

The Caucasian world rapidly adapted itself to the Russian efforts, having switched on the centuries-old mechanisms of confrontation and preservation of the foundations of their socio-political, spiritual and moral and existential identity and treated the Russians not as innovators-reformers but regarded them as just another enemies, as the uninvited strangers against whom the Caucasian tribes used the traditional systems of mobilization.

Russia itself, being a feudal state, had no means to conduct an effective economic colonial policy. A lack of highly-developed industry, of huge free financial capital to be used on the colonized territories resulted in the fact that the Caucasus from the economic point of view during all the active phase of the struggle remained unprofitable for Russia. For this very reason it was unable either to effectively develop the natural resources of the Caucasus or to fill it with consumer goods.

An important role for the formation of the new economic and social space was given to the development of the means of communication whose insufficient number in the Caucasus posed a constant threat of the destabilization of the Russian domination in the region.

But even the construction of the branch-lines of the Vladikavkaz railway did not allow it to integrate all the social and economic territory of the region with Russia and civilize it in Russia's own manner, as the impact of this instrument of colonization, the development of the commercial agriculture and, later, industry chiefly involved the settlers' sections and territories, hardly affecting the mountaineous areas of the Caucasian territory inhabited by the native tribes.

Having come to the Caucasus, the Russians only consolidated the feudal structures and broadened the sphere of the feudal oppression by imposing all kinds of duties related to the construction of the railways, and also by billeting the Russian troops in the settlements (Жапин 292).

In Kabarda and Daghestan the clans of the mountaineous princes and the nobility failed to recover their property confiscated by the Russian authorities and the Imamate, and also failed to recover their former privileges. The rural confederations of Chechnya and Daghestan that supported the Imamate, were deprived of their pasturable mountains, moreover, during the military operations their numerous fields on the mountain terraces were destroyed ("Северный Кавказ в составе Российской империи" 164). Besides, the re-settlement policy of the Russian authorities triggered the new contradictions and paved the way to the debates between the mountain tribes by moving their settlements to the territories which historically had never belonged to them and could only be exploited with Russia's consent.

The presence of Russia was perceived by the majority of the mountaineous peoples as the aggravation of the general situation in the mountain society, which made the Caucasian relics of the past – the usual traditional life – more attractive. The mountain peoples used to cling to their patriarchy as a means of the preservation of their identity and the former "free" mode of life.

The efforts of the Russian side were concentrated

not so much on the socio-moral and political and legal aspects of the cultural mission as on the consolidation of the positions of feudalism in an unacceptable, especially for the Muslim mountainous community, form. And therefore instead of the creative efforts there emerged a competitive struggle of the wills that turned a deaf ear to and were irreconcilable with one another.

The insufficiency of the Russian efforts became especially conspicuous in the confrontation in the spiritual sphere, where the Islamic mullahs succeeded in mobilizing the fears and a lack of understanding among the mountainous population into the anti-Russian sentiments and rejection of any impulses from the Russian side.

The poor missionary potential was also displayed by the Russian Orthodox Church that had failed to take all due measures to train a sufficient number of vigorous and dedicated missionaries both from the Russian and from the native Caucasian environment. The influence of the official Orthodoxy was also reduced by the fact that the Russian forces operating in the Caucasus consisted of a substantial layer of the Old Belief confessions considered by the official authorities and the Church as one of the varieties of the hostile force. Generally speaking, any successes, if at all, of the Orthodox Caucasian missionary work were achieved within the framework of the Orthodox Georgia and, partially, of Ossetia.

Culturally and mentally the world of Russia was too far away from the world of the Caucasus (Карпов) and did not evoke any piety in the mountainous tribes and, for this reason, it (the world of Russia) could only occupy the territories which, to some extent, responded to its impulses. These territories, as it has been emphasized, were the Christian peoples of the Caucasus, and also a part of the mountainous peoples' non-Christian elite, which in the opportune forms – mercenary or political – took the side of Russia.

All other social sites had to be won back by ousting and driving out the native element and replacing the vacant space by the Slavonic-Christian element, or Russia had to suppress by force of arms the part of the natives who had failed to find some other ways to respond to the Russian intrusion upon their world.

Having failed to change either natural or social foundations of the life in the mountaineous part of the Caucasus, Russia with its efforts only distorted the natural flow of the social and spiritual impulses of the Caucasian life, never succeeding in bridging the culture gap between the Russian and the Caucasian world.

The ways of the organization of everyday life in the Russian popular and military masses as such failed to defeat the Caucasian foundations both in the everyday occurrence of their communal life and in the means of their realization and therefore they failed to prove their superiority. The visible and available forms of adoption of the mountainous principles of life that the Russian settlers in the Caucasus used to involuntarily to resort to, finally undermined the Caucasians' trust in the Russian settlers.

Seeing the poor way of the organization of everyday life in the Russian settlements and military fortifications, watching the soldiers living in booths built of poles or reed, watching the redoubts territory sinking in mud, the mountain peoples could not be filled with respect for such colonizers. All this was known to the mountainous

peoples from their own experience and therefore they saw no reason to consider that the Russian middle was any better than their own lifestyle.

The situation was aggravated (particularly in the first third of the XIX c.) by the numerous errors of the Russian military authorities by whose orders, according to F.F. Tornau, the troops “would incessantly occupy the territories when there was no need for it, build fortifications unfit both for the locality and the kind war, lodge the garrisons not strong enough to keep the inhabitants in awe, thus scattering their forces, would unreasonably expose the troops to diseases and all kinds of deprivation and by these false measures would offer the mountainous peoples the opportunity to rob and kill the Russian soldiers” (“Секретная миссия в Черкесию русского разведчика барона Ф.Ф. Торнау. Воспоминания и документы” 59).

The Caucasian ethnic groups, in their turn, were attached to their feeding and spacious landscapes that would generate the specific stereotypes of the social behaviour and “sounding” which, due to their nature, would set the mountainous peoples’ mentality against the Russians (Гумилёв 410-412).

The schools for the mountaineers and all other ways of their involvement in the Russian world made no sense in the Caucasian mountains that remained outside the bounds of the conditions encompassing the mountaineer socium of the landscapes and, consequently, leaving practically intact the conditions of the birth and functioning of the traditional form and essence of the mountaineer universe and world-view.

The mountainous culture was chiefly the culture of the struggle and for the struggle inherent in the societies of the kin-and-tribe stage of the development which erased any border between a peaceful and a non-peaceful everyday life. “In all the parts of the world the years of war were followed by the years of peace, but in the Caucasus the time of war had never completely ceased. If there were no outside attacks, the peaceful part of the Caucasian population was in constant need for the protection of their territory from the attacks of the mountaineers, whom nobody so far had succeeded in subduing and who had never been made to abandon their semi-wild rapacious life that hindered the development of succeeded in the wellbeing of their neighboring peaceful parts of the region” (Романовский 23).

The traditional isolationism that was hard to crush, landed the mountain culture the essential homogeneity endowing it with a powerful conflict potential sufficient enough to oppose any other heterogeneous and open culture, including the Russian culture.

As an efficient alternative the Russian side, on the basis of the results of its experience of many years’ standing, accepted, in the long run, for the realization the plan of general Yevdokimov who would destroy one of the most important pillars of the mountainous world – the principle of isolation, independence from anyone – by imposing close neighborhood with the Cossack stanitsas. This contradicted the world-vision of the mountaineers of freedom and the proper way of life but resulted in the fact that the mountainous North-West, as previously the North-East Caucasus, was conquered, though not transformed.

For too long in many places and fields of life of

the Caucasus Russia had had to compete with the ideas and values of Islam, that tried to promote solidarity with all those who disagreed with the Russian presence in the region.

Soon after the Russian’ appearance in the mountainous regions, the Caucasus put forward its own understanding of the socio-political and cultural and moral organization of the society – the Muridism and Imamate, which opened the counter motion and proposed their own forms of colonization of the Caucasus, spreading them beyond the bounds of the mountainous region of Daghestan and Chechnya.

The presence of the Muridism as an alternative to the Russian ideology and of the Imamate as a political and legal alternative to the Russian political system considerably diminished the colonization efforts of Russia and for many years had allowed them to resist the penetration of the Russian influence into the mountainous environment. Now the success of the Russian colonization depended on how fast it would be able to put an end to the organizational structures of the Imamate and the mobilizational efforts of the Muridism at least in the North-East part of the Caucasian territory.

Even certain successes of Russia in the North Caucasus after 1864 took decades to bring the territory to the state of the normal – by Caucasian measures – life and reduce the degree of mutual dislike. The results were not good enough. The Mukhudzhism as the manifestation of the culture shock and the ongoing irreconcilable dislike of the Russian world can be proof of this.

During the entire XIX c. the Russian authorities lacked time, sufficient means and comprehensive efforts. The main obstacle was that together and practically simultaneously with the colonization of the Caucasus there continued the colonization of Siberia and Central Asia. Besides Russia itself underwent its own transformation after 1861, having taken the road of modernization, and, therefore, despite the victory won over the irreconcilable mountaineers, it failed to mobilize to a sufficient degree its efforts on the transformation of the Caucasus which, after 1864, ceased to be an acute problem and was shifted to the rank of other intra-Russian tasks.

The complexity of the Caucasian task was that the tradition would permanently defeat modernization. From the point of view of M.V. Ponomaryov (32), modernization is a collective term characterizing various aspects of the transition from the traditional to the industrial society and also the progressive evolution of the forms of the industrial society itself. For the Islamic part of the Caucasus modernization was not only extremely painful per se but also because it was coming not only from the victorious enemy, but, worst of all, from the adherents of a different faith.

The regularity and adherence to traditionalism became an urgent necessity among the mountaineers. Traditionalism was seeking for and succeeded in finding its allies everywhere. It was greatly promoted by isolationism as an ancient and habitual way of life of the mountaineer communities.

To counteract the traditional strongholds they needed reliable and loyal, trained communicators, the transmitters of the new values and motivations.

Even towards the end of XIX century, when Russia was experiencing an industrial boom, its available

industrial potential, first of all, the products of its functioning, which might have been proof of the superiority of the new conditions of life, practically did not reach the mountainous population. If certain crumbs did reach them, they (the crumbs) were delivered through such middlemen that were unlikely to replace the Russian forces.

Being unable to fully change the mountaineers' world vision and traditional values, Russia could hardly be successful in its colonization policy in the mountainous part of the Caucasus, constantly facing the ever-lasting antagonism of the mountainous social environment. Consequently, it would be more accurate to speak, touching on the problem of colonization, not so much about the colonization of the Caucasus, as about its conquest. The colonization proper would embrace the local, though not vast, regions of the Caucasian territory, chiefly and in the first place connected with Russia either by the initial community of religion or it would reach the places, occupied by the Slavonic-Christian population, who had settled in the rural areas of the Ciscaucasian steppes, or in the towns of the North Caucasus founded by them.

Without identifying some cultural and moral and existential universality, equally acceptable by both sides it would be impossible to expect a successful coexistence of the worlds antagonistic to each other. During the entire XIX and the first decades of XX century the Russian world failed either to find or develop the essential universalism.

Such universal formula was proposed by the Bolsheviks who hoisted the flag of the social equality and became successors to the "Russian cause" in the Caucasus. They made big progress though, as it has turned out, it was also temporary. Their social policy was faulty which also strongly relied upon the use of force. The Bolsheviks, as the representatives of the Russian world, also ignored those sides of the Caucasian life which maintained the age-old traditionalism and patriarchy and which, like the phoenix, quickly revived as soon as the outside pressure weakened. The general failure of bolshevism in Russia and, on the other hand, the recovery of the traditional structures, began once again to alienate the Caucasus from Russia, at any rate the Caucasus again turned into a very hot issue of the Russian political system.

By the XXI<sup>st</sup> century Russia had faced a new problem no colonial state had ever succeeded in escaping – the reverse movement of the inhabitants of the metropolys' former regions of colonization. Russia again happened to be unprepared to the situation when the reverse movement of the natives of the Caucasus in the direction of Russia would bring the Caucasian world, in this or that form, to its towns and villages. This unpreparedness gave rise to – this time in the Russian world, in its much broader circles – partial bewilderment, partial disagreement with the intrusion of the social life practically foreign to it of the world they had heard of or read about in the books of the classics of literature and with which, but with a rare exception, they had really interacted.

Having come to the Caucasus more than 300 years ago for the geopolitical considerations, having embarked on its colonization, Russia forgot about the feedback, about the inevitable Caucasian influence on Russia. Having prepared the armies, the initiators of the colonization of the Caucasus forgot to prepare their population to the

encounter with the Caucasus.

The dislike for the details and failure to take into account the multilevel and multidimensional element in the course of the development of the strategic plans seems to be the inescapable drawback in the work of the Russian political elite. This Achilles' heel of the mentality of the Russian world does not make it possible for the society in a well-organized form to address these or other civilizational challenges so as not to resort to hasty improvisation when mobilizing the people and the resources.

The indicated drawbacks of the strategic planning each time lead to repeated tactical blunders. And though all the previous historical experience shows that Russia, when all is said and done, always seeks successful solutions to the state problems it is faced with, however, the unforgivable neglect of the details and attendant factors considerably add to the price of any of its victories.

The Caucasus in a number of the historical challenges cannot be called quite a successful project of Russia for, though it was conquered by force of arms and transformed in the part occupied by the Slavonic-Christian settlers, the Russian world stopped in bewilderment before the unyielding and unresponsive to its impulses traditionalism of the Caucasian mountaineers.

After the lapse of so many centuries, from the beginning of the colonial aspiration of the Russian world to the Caucasus, it has become even more evident, that as long as the mountain ethnicities preserve their positions in their feeding and spacious landscapes, as long as the landscapes themselves remain intact, it is impossible to expect every mountaineer to cease to draw the demarcation line between the world of the Caucasus and the world of Russia and Russia to change its opinion of the mountaineers of the Caucasus.

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